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FOREWORD: POST-CHICAGO LAW AND ECONOMICS
RANDY

INTRODUCTION:

A

E. BARNETT*

NEW ERA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

This is not another "law-and-econ" bashing symposium. Nor is the
symposium's title intended to denigrate Chicago School law and economics any more than the term "Post-Keynesian economics" was intended to
denigrate the work of John Maynard Keynes. Instead, this symposium
marks the fact that many practitioners of law and economics have moved
well beyond the stereotypes familiar to most legal academics. Rather
than designating an entirely new school of thought, the term "Post-Chicago law and economics" refers to a new era in which a variety of new
questions about law and lawmaking is being asked and a variety of promising economic techniques is being used to answer them.
Yet most legal academics who, like me, are not part of the law and
economics movement are generally unaware of these changes. The purpose of this "Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics" is to
bring some of these new methods and questions to the attention of mainstream legal academics and others. The hope is that those who have
shunned the economic analysis of law in the past may wish to reconsider
their stance in light of what Post-Chicago law and economics has to offer. To facilitate this, I will use this Foreword to summarize the new
directions suggested by each of the symposium contributors, most of
whom are practitioners of law and economics.
I.

EXPANDING THE ECONOMIC MODEL

In his symposium article,1 Robert Ellickson suggests that the time
has come for practitioners of law and economics to take seriously Arthur
Leff's well-known criticism of the dominant "rational-actor" model employed by law and economics. 2 "Despite the unarguable costs of complexity," Professor Ellickson says, "economists should now seek to
* Professor and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This Foreword was written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical
Law-and-Economics, 65 CH.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) (Professor Ellickson's paper appears in this
symposium issue).
2.

(1974).

See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451
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modify the rational-actor paradigm in order to give it greater power."'3
In particular, he urges that insights provided by psychology and sociology could be integrated into economic analysis. He believes that such
improvements would not necessitate "a paradigm shift-like that from
Ptolemy to Copernicus-but rather only a paradigm improvement-like
'4
that from Copernicus to Kepler."
Professor Ellickson begins by presenting some empirical indications
that, while law and economics is hardly in decline, it has ceased to grow
in recent years. He reports that both the number of law professors with
doctorates in economics at Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale law
schools and the proportion of articles with a law and economics slant
published in the law reviews of these four schools have held relatively
constant since 1970. 5 He also presents evidence that, while law and economics has spread throughout academia since 1970, even this process of
diffusion appears to have slowed or stopped. 6 Moreover, the increased
professionalization of law and economics has tended to confine its use to
specialists. "Today, when many of the obvious and easy applications
have been done," he observes, "a young scholar with only a modest
amount of technical training can no longer be as optimistic about being
able to make a contribution." '7 Ellickson believes that by enriching its
model with insights provided by modern psychology and sociology, law
and economics may experience a renewal and growth. Psychology provides information about the internal influences of human behavior, while
sociology provides information about the external influences on human
behavior.
A.

IntegratingInsights from Psychology

In his discussion of psychology, Professor Ellickson summarizes the
findings of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman that when
confronted with a choice among a set of prospects, a person is likely to
use an arbitrary reference point to judge whether achieving a particular prospect would constitute a loss or a foregone gain. This has consequences because a person is likely to be loss-averse, that is, to regard a
loss from a reference point as more momentous than foregoing an apparently equivalent gain from that same reference point. 8
Professor Ellickson gives two examples of how this insight from psy3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ellickson, supra note 1, at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 30-32
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
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chology may be usefully applied to law. First, in the takings area this
analysis "predicts that an ordinary landowner would feel the loss of a
psychologically vested right of a given market value more keenly than he
would the loss of a prospect (a psychologically unvested right) of identical market value." 9 The second example is in the area of adverse possession, where "even a knowing adverse possessor would eventually start
regarding the possessed land not as a prospect but rather as a vested
right" 10 and where "during a period of adverse possession an absent true
owner would likely be psychologically pulling up stakes, thereby becoming less likely to frame as a 'loss' the possible relinquishment of the land
to the adverse possessor."'"
Professor Ellickson then summarizes the research of Henry Simon
regarding the limitations of human cognitive capacities. "The reality
that cognitive limitations impair the learning of law makes legal instrumentalism much more difficult. An analyst must become involved in the
messy matter of the extent to which actors will respond to formal legal
signals."1 2 Professor Ellickson would use this insight from psychology to
examine when a legal system should take into account human cognitive
limitations,' 3 the "legibility" of legal rules to persons whose conduct they
are supposed to guide, 14 and the role of such intermediaries as lawyers,
reporters, and insurance companies in providing ex ante legal information to actors. 15 He concludes his discussion of psychology by briefly
considering the possible implications of cognitive barriers to dissonant
information for consumer protection and workers compensation statutes, 16 as well as the limitations on a person's ability to "unfailingly exe17
cute decisions made about his own future conduct."'
B.

IntegratingInsights from Sociology

Next, Professor Ellickson discusses some ways that insights from
sociology can improve economic analysis. In contrast to "mainstream
economic theory [that] takes tastes as exogenous givens ... [s]ome economists, and also some critics of economics, have striven to speculate on
9. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

at 37-38.
at 39.
at
at
at
at
at
at

40-41.
41.
40-42.
42.
42-43.
43.
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the origin and legitimacy of preferences."' 8 Aside from "deepening the
normative power of economics," he thinks "a successful theory of taste
formation would enable economists better to make positive predictions of
shifts in supply and demand curves."1 9 After sketching his own "suggestive model" of the internalization of culture, 20 he applies this model to
three contexts of human behavior: economic exchange, social, exchange,
and political behavior.2 1 With respect to political behavior, he explains
how the inculturation model may enrich public choice analysis 22 of legislative and judicial behavior. 23 "The mark of a true economist," Professor
Ellickson concludes, "is not fealty to the classical rational-actor model,
but rather openness to any technique that would improve understanding
24
of complex human behavior."

C. Judge Posner Replies
In The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 25
Judge Richard Posner responds both to Professor Ellickson's empirical
claim that the law and economics movement is losing steam and to his
suggestion that law and economics could use a healthy dose of psychology and sociology. Although he questions the strength of the evidence
supporting Professor Ellickson's claim, assuming the claim is correct,
Judge Posner offers four possible explanations for the phenomenon.
First, at some point the relative growth of any portion of the law school
curriculum must cease.2 6 Second, space must be made for new interdisciplinary movements, such as feminist jurisprudence, law and literature,
and critical legal studies.2 7 Third, given the opportunity costs of economists, it "is cheaper to fill teaching slots with refugees from the humanities, alumni of public-interest firms, and aspiring constitutional
18. Id. at 44-45. One of the economists cited by Ellickson as having explored this issue is Lewis
Kornhauser, another contributor to this symposium. See id. at 45 n.67.
19. Id. at 45.
20. Id. at 45-48.
21. Id. at 48-55.
22. Id. at 51-52. "Public choice" analysis is another facet of Post-Chicago law and economics
that only recently has begun to receive the widespread attention of legal academics. See, e.g., Farber
& Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987). The public choice
approach is examined in this symposium by Jerry Mashaw and Dan Farber. See infra notes 61-106
and accompanying text (summarizing their contributions).
23. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 52-55. The use of economic analysis to analyze judicial behavior
is represented here by the contribution of Lewis Kornhauser and a comment by Jonathon Macey.
See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text (summarizing their contributions).
24. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 55.
25. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 57 (1989) (Judge Posner's comment appears in this symposium issue).
26. Id. at 57.
27. Id. at 57-58.
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lawyers."' 28 Finally, Judge Posner maintains that an empirical discipline
can make little headway in the absence of empirical inquiry. Yet "law
professors have neither training nor taste for systematic empirical re'29
search, which would inevitably involve statistical analysis."
Judge Posner cautions against using other disciplines to "supply a
facile explanation for every regularity (or peculiarity) in human behavior,"' 30 explanations that cannot be tested empirically. "[T]oo many bells

and whistles," he says, "will stop the analytic engine in its tracks."' 3'
Abandoning the simple rational-actor model prematurely may cause
economists to overlook straightforward explanations of behavior. Moreover, much of modem sociology and anthropology, he says, is implicitly
32
economic in its methods.

Finally, because the premise of this symposium is that law and economics has moved into a new era, it is significant that at one point Judge
Posner implicitly acknowledges this development. Responding to Professor Ellickson's call to broaden the economic model, Judge Posner cites to
his own writings and observes that "[t]o some extent .. .Ellickson is

preaching to the converted." ' 33 He notes that economists are already incorporating altruism and information costs, for example, into their
analysis.

34

II.

FROM SUBSTANCE TO PROCESS

Traditional law and economics has mainly focused its attention on
the consequences of what H.L.A. Hart calls the "primary rules" that
regulate individual conduct. 35 Post-Chicago law and economics is extending the focus of economic analysis beyond the substance of the law to
the judicial and legislative processes that generate and enforce primary
rules. This expanded inquiry includes the procedural "secondary
rules" 36 that regulate those persons who administer the legal system.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.

35.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961) ("primary rules are concerned with the

actions that individuals must or must not do").
36. Id. ("secondary rules ... specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined").
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The Economic Analysis of the JudicialProcess

In discussing the potential contribution of inculturation models on
the law and economics model, Robert Ellickson observes that recognizing the role of ideology in judicial decision-making is "a conspicuous
break from the Chicagoan orthodoxy that ideas don't matter. '3 7 Law
and economics scholars, he says, have "yet to confront the murky issues
''3
that arise once one admits the influence of ideology on judges. 8
Jonathan Macey notes that "[e]conomists have had virtually nothing to
say about judicial decision-making in general or stare decisis in particular."' 39 Lewis Kornhauser begins his symposium article by observing:
"To the normative question 'How ought judges to decide cases?' some
economic analysts, though not all, respond: Judges ought to decide cases
to promote efficiency. To the positive question, . . . 'By what principles
or practices of reasoning do judges in fact decide cases?'-economic analysts of law have remained silent." 4
1. Professor Kornhauser's Analysis of Stare Decisis
Professor Kornhauser brings the tools of economic analysis to bear
on an aspect of judicial decisionmaking that has, until now, been considered the turf of legal philosophy: what is the nature of legal reasoning?
He seriously examines the requirement of formal justice that "like cases
should be treated alike." He frames his inquiry as follows: "Phrased in
its starkest form, stare decisis 'requires' a judge, once she has determined
that the instant case is governed by a prior decision, to adhere to that
prior decision even when she believes that prior decision to have been
wrongly decided." ' 4 1 In sum, he asks: "What justifies adherence to a de42
cision known to be wrong?"
Although I cannot fairly summarize Professor Kornhauser's intricate analysis here, I can explain how, in addition to its focus on the secondary rules governing lawmaking, it exemplifies three other distinctive
features of Post-Chicago law and economics. First, the manner in which
he frames the issue requires a close consideration of the possibility of
judicial errors. In other words, Professor Kornhauser's analysis does not
assume that judges have "perfect information" of either the law or facts
37. Ellickson, supra note I, at 53.
38. Id. at 53-54.
39. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 39, 39 (1989) (Professor Macey's comment appears in this symposium issue).
40. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 63
(1989) (citations omitted) (Professor Kornhauser's article appears in this symposium issue).
41. Id. at 66.
42. Id.

FOREWORD

of disputes and, instead, identifies four potential sources of erroneous judicial decisions: changes in values, changes in the world, improvements
in information, and incompetence. 4 3 He then uses this analysis to critically assess three "jurisprudential" justifications of adhering to erroneous
44
decisions: fairness, competence, and certainty.
Second, at a crucial juncture of the analysis, he employs the techniques of game theory to explain how participants in a legal system may
find it in their interest to agree to a regime of stare decisis even when they
disagree over the more basic values of the system. 4 5 Although long
known to economists and philosophers, the use of game theory to assess
problems of coordination in the absence of perfect information is new to
legal analysis and is one of the distinctive analytic methods associated
with Post-Chicago law and economics.
Third, in contrast to what he terms "the standard assumptions of
the economic analysis of accident law," ' 46 Professor Kornhauser presents
a model which attempts to incorporate an element of uncertainty created
by a changing world.4 7 Indeed, it is impossible even to consider stare
decisis without taking time and change into account, for the doctrine
requires that a rule announced at one point in time be adhered to at some
4
later time.

8

2.

The Value of Process: Professor Macey's Comment

Professor Kornhauser concludes his analysis of stare decisis with the
intriguing observation that "the paradox of stare decisis most often
emerges only when the substantive values of the judges differ from the
criteria that determine when two cases are equivalent." ' 49 This potential
discrepancy between the substance of legal decisions and the formal process that produces legal decisions provides Jonathan Macey with a point
of departure from Professor Kornhauser's analysis of stare decisis. By
stressing the relationship between substantive and procedural concerns,
43. Id. at 68-73.
44. Id. at 73-78.
45. Id. at 78-82.
46. Id. at 82, n.31.
47. To this end, he modifies a model presented in Blume & Rubinfeld. The Dynamics oftlhe
Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAI STui. 405 (1982).
48. For a discussion of how standard economic methods inadequately take time into account.
see G. O'DRIsCOI. & M. Rizzo, THI" ECONOMICS OF TiM! AND IGNORANCr 2-3 (1985).
49. Kornhauser, supra note 40. at 91. I discuss the usefulness of these different perspectives in
Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and ConstitttionalLegitimacy. 64 CHI.-KIN-r L. Riv.
37, 41-47 (1988). I examine the valmu of distinct, competing modes of analysis in Barnett. Foreword:
Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibilityof Moral Rights and Consequemnialist Analyses, 12 HAR\.
J. L. & Putt. Poi 'Y 611, 634-35 (1989) (hereinafter Chickens & Eggs).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:3

Professor Macey's analysis of the doctrine of stare decisis further elaborates this important dimension of Post-Chicago law and economics.
Professor Macey begins by questioning whether Professor Kornhauser's evaluation of the procedural characteristic of stare decisis takes
substantive uncertainty seriously enough. "[C]entral to Professor Kornhauser's model is the assumption that judges actually know what the socially desirable outcome is. .

.

. By phrasing the question in this way,

however, Professor Kornhauser presumes that judges enjoy a far greater
degree of certainty about the socially desirable outcome in a particular
case than they actually do." 50 Professor Macey thinks that, by adopting
this assumption, Professor Kornhauser overlooks three significant advantages of stare decisis. First, it "enables judges to leverage a single skillthe ability to tell when like cases are alike-into a facility for deciding a
wide variety of cases that involve substantive legal issues about which the
judges may know next to nothing.15 1 Second, it enables judges to "allocate their human capital in such a way as to become expert in a particular field, such as admiralty, criminal procedure, or securities regulation,
confident that they can rely on other judges' expertise in the areas in
which they have not specialized." 51 2 Third, the ability of fallible judges to
check their conclusions against those reached by other judges helps them
53
to avoid errors of judgment.
While traditional law and economics typically assumes that the substantively correct outcome can readily be discerned for individual cases,
each of the advantages of stare decisis identified by Professor Macey only
accrues if judges (and even academic commentators) often are unable to
make a "substantively" correct decision in individual cases. Professor
Macey concludes that the "idea of stare decisis requires that we appreciate the intractable problem of uncertainty that plagues judges when they
decide cases ....

In other words, stare decisis can be justified only on the

grounds that it provides a basis for judicial decision-making when judges
don't know what the correct answer is."' 54 In a world of perfect decisionmaking, adhering to such procedural constraints as stare decisis would be
unnecessary and irrational, but Post-Chicago law and economics does
not assume such a world.
To evaluate Professor Kornhauser's thesis, Professor Macey
presents his own four-fold economic analysis of stare decisis-an analysis
50.

Macey, supra note 39, at 94-95.

51. Id. at 95.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54.

Id.

1989]
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that explores the relationship between substance and process. First, Professor Macey analyzes the doctrine's ability to assist judges in making
substantively correct legal decisions. 55 Second, he considers how stare
decisis increases information concerning the substance of the law,
thereby decreasing the incidence of litigation. 56 Third, he suggests that
stare decisis helps appellate courts identify when trial judges have "decide[d] cases in ways that are more consistent with their own preferences
than with the preferences of society as a whole."' 57 Stare decisis also
makes it possible for a judicial system to establish much-needed conventions in situations where it matters less which rule is adopted than it does
58
that some rule be adopted uniformly.
Employing Professor Kornhauser's distinction between strong and
weak versions of stare decisis, 59 Professor Macey concludes his comment
by offering a "public choice" account of why judges may find it in their
interest to adhere to a weak form of the doctrine rather than abandon the
doctrine or adopt a stronger version. 60 Professor Macey often uses public choice analysis in his writings in public law fields, and it is to this
dimension of Post-Chicago law and economics that I now turn.
B.

The Economic Analysis of the Legislative Process

Although Jerry Mashaw acknowledges in his symposium article the
"rich history of law and economics talk in public law fields,"' 6 1 he observes that only in the last decade has public choice theory begun to
appear in legal scholarship. "And only within the last four or five years
have debates about the relevance of such things as 'interest group theory'
and 'Arrow's Theorem' begun to achieve prominence in legal academic
discussions of constitutional and administrative law and statutory interpretation." '62 For Professor Mashaw, this application of economic analysis to public law is distinctive from previous efforts insofar as "the issues
posed and sometimes answered by the new political economy are almost
exclusively issues of institutional structure and decisionmaking process
rather than issues of substantive policy."' 63 Thus, Post-Chicago law and
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
L. REV.
62.
63.

Id. at 102-106.
Id. at 106-107.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108-109.
Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 73-74.
Macey, supra note 39, at 112-13.
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and The Understanding of Public Law. 65 Cm.-KINT
123, 124 (1989) (Professor Mashaw's article appears in this symposium issue).
Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 125.
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economics' shift of focus in the legislative sphere from substance to process parallels its shift in focus from the substance of judicial decisions to
the process of judicial decision-making.
1.

Public Choice Analysis of Politics and Legislation

Professor Mashaw begins his article by describing the issues that
currently divide scholars who take public choice analysis seriously. He
identifies two strands of the public choice approach: decision theory and
interest group theory.
The first is a branch of decision theory symbolized and much-informed
by Kenneth Arrow's general possibility theorem. This literature is
concerned predominantly with the structure of voting rules and with
the effect of voting structures on the outcome of collective decisionmaking. . . . The second branch ...[is] unified by a basic axiom:
Political actions are to be explained in terms of a simple hypothesis
concerning human behavior-people act to further their own material
interests. 64
Although his paper deals primarily with the second of these two
branches, interest group theory, Professor Mashaw maintains that both
are "essential for an overall theory of political action. We need to understand both how individuals behave, or are likely to behave, and how their
resulting collective action may be shaped or influenced by the institutions
6' 5
and decision rules through which that action is mediated.
Because early efforts to apply interest group theory to public law
have become controversial, Professor Mashaw examines two principal
criticisms of this branch of public choice theory. First is the normative
criticism that public choice insights obstruct the effort to construct an
ethically attractive public law. Second is the criticism that public choice
theory is an inaccurate depiction of the real world of public law. His aim
is not to refute all criticism of public choice, but to show that it is premature to kill the public choice baby in its crib.
a.

The Normative Merits of Interest Group Theory

Professor Mashaw summarizes the normative critique as follows:
According to this view, the purpose of collective action is not just to do
something that has already been determined to serve the individual
ends of the participants, but instead to discover and express collective
or public purposes. Hence, the institutions of public or collective
choice must be constructed to facilitate collective or public discovery
and expression of public ideals and public demands. Public choice the64. Id. at 126.
65. Id.
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ory's view of collective choice mechanisms as mere techniques for preference aggregation, and of individual participation in public choice as
aimed merely at achieving the most advantageous bargain given preexisting individual preferences, cannot possibly lead to an appropriate
understanding of how citizens or officeholders should behave in their
public roles or of how public institutions should be understood or
designed.66
Mashaw suggests that critics have mistaken the positive claims of interest
group theory for normative claims. Public choice is offered as a potentially valuable explanatory technique in a world where assertions of public-interest by political actors are not easily assessed and are often
insincere. Public choice adherents do not claim that all public institutions should be nothing more than mechanisms of interest group satisfaction; instead they think that the interest group assumption illuminates
the legislative process. To quarrel with this response, however, requires
an assessment of the descriptive merits of the public choice method.
Deserving of more serious consideration, Mashaw thinks, are the
potentially adverse effects of the public choice way of thinking on public
morality. This criticism is analogous to the claim that judges who accept
the teachings of legal realism end up debasing the judicial process when
they act consistently with these teachings. It also resembles the claim
that acceptance of the philosophy of legal positivism by German judges
contributed to the perversion of their legal system. These criticisms all
share the assumption that, when they are internalized by individual actors, descriptive theories can be self-fulfilling prophesies with normatively unattractive implications. An irony occurs when those who offer
this criticism of public choice "realism" in the legislative process simultaneously embrace a realist perspective on the judicial process.
Mashaw responds by examining the impact that interest group theory appears to have had on institutional reform. 67 Although he thinks
interest group theory has heavily permeated the reform efforts of the past
three decades, "[t]he activist optimism of the 1960s has been replaced by
pessimism bordering on the cynical ....
For some, the only public purpose worthy of respect seems to be the elimination of the public sector
itself."' 68 With the increasing cognizance of public choice insights among
legal academics, Professor Mashaw sees this attitude carrying over to the
domain of statutory interpretation. In place of a presumption of public
interest, statutes may be viewed as compromise bargains between contending factions. Professor Mashaw explains why "one should expect
66. Id. at 128-29.
67. Id. at 131-33.
68. Id. at 133.
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that this new learning would induce courts to be positivist in their legal
philosophy, formalist in their approach to constitutional legitimacy and
literalist in their interpretive technique."' 69 He then presents evidence indicating that "the jurisprudence of the Burger court, as well as its Rehnquistian successor, . . . is at least congruent with the public choice
'70
perspective."
Professor Mashaw also relates the reply to this normative criticism
offered by Nobel laureate James Buchanan, the father of modern public
choice ("Virginia School") economics.
According to Professor
Buchanan, the model is constructed to enable the discovery of mechanisms that can effectively guard against the very type of self-aggrandizing
behavior it assumes. 7' Professor Mashaw thinks this puts Buchanan on
the same side of the dispute about whether politics is simply the way that
wholly exogenous preferences are satisfied "as people like Steven Kelman, Cass Sunstein and Mark Kelman. ' 72 With the dispute over preference endogeneity largely settled, Professor Mashaw thinks it is time for
"republicanish" theorists to confront the reality of preference or taste
formation.7 3 He suspects that when they do they will find that the "strategic control of self-interest through institutional design may be essential
'7 4
both to the achievement and the maintenance of a fully rational polity."
He concludes that a:
Kirkegardian leap of faith into didactic republicanism may be a good
strategy, but it may also be folly. And in any event, it is a faith that I
cannot will myself into. I, at least, am going to need some more persuading
that acting as if the republican story were true will make it
75
so.

b.

The Descriptive Merits of Interest Group Theory

After rejecting the idea that public choice should stop telling harmful truths, Professor Mashaw turns his attention to those who condemn
public choice for telling lies. He picks up where Daniel Farber and
Philip Frickey's 1987 article, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice,76 leaves
off. Although in general agreement with their analysis, Professor
Mashaw fears that their article "may have given too much comfort ... to
those who would respond to its debunking of some of public choice's
69. Id. at 135.
70. Id.
71.

Id. at 138.

72. Id. at 139.
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 140-41 (cmphasis ini original. citations omitted).
76. See Farber & Frickey.supra note 22.
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more extravagant claims, 'Thank God. Another field of social science we

can safely ignore.'

77

Professor Mashaw agrees with Professors Farber and Frickey that
studies establishing the beneficial effects of legislation on particular interest groups "demonstrate neither that the legislation investigated is without public interest effects, nor that it was adopted because of private
interest pressures or concerns. '7 8 Yet, according to Professor Mashaw,
"such studies are one useful element of the 'old' law and economics approach to public law."' 79 Knowing who wins and who loses and by how
much is not only "a necessary part of strategic public management, it is
crucial to a normative consideration of whether the legislation is in the
public interest."' 80 And the fact that such studies are not dispositive does
not mean that they fail to support, to some degree, the newer public
choice perspective on public law.
A demonstration that legislation has big wealth distribution effects,
combined with a demonstration that it has large costs and few benefits,
and was enacted through a process that was highly likely to have promoted nefarious forms of rent seeking by benefited groups, would provide a pretty strong indictment of a8 1particular statute (or statutory
provision) on public policy grounds.
Professor Mashaw is concerned that some readers are likely to conclude from Professors Farber and Frickey's praise of ideology as a predictor of legislator behavior that the factor of self-interest can safely be
dismissed. He considers some of the difficulties of constructing models of
behavior based solely on ideology,8 2 and of some of the methodological
weaknesses of ideology-based studies performed to date. 3 He notes that
Professors Farber and Frickey were careful to claim that "models containing ideology and economic factors outperform purely economic models .... There is no claim here that pure ideological models outperform
pure economic models. Nor can any conclusion be drawn from these
studies about which sorts of factors are more substantial." '8 4 He also attempts to place in perspective Professors Farber and Frickey's discussion
of the empirical evidence on voter behavior, 5 a discussion which he fears
"easily could mislead those looking for reassurance that public choice
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Mashaw. supra note 61. at 143.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. tit148.
Id. at 148-49.
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can safely be ignored." 86
Finally, Professor Mashaw discusses the limits of the public choice
approach. In particular, he criticizes the efforts of Jonathan Macey and
Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner to infer a normative theory of statutory interpretation from public choice's positive account of
legislation. Public choice insights lead each to urge a different mode of
statutory interpretation, and Mashaw offers brief criticisms of each. He
concludes that the best of public choice research in this area and others
tells us "to be skeptical of our prior Panglossian presuppositions concerning the structure and dynamics of political action, but also to be skeptical
87
of the public choice approach's capacity to make definitive findings."
2.

Public Choice in Perspective: Professor Farber's Comment

In his comment on Professor Mashaw's article,8 8 Daniel Farber discusses both the role of self-interest and ideology in the political process
and the implications of decision theory, the other branch of public choice
theory that Professor Mashaw describes but does not assess. Professor
Farber re-emphasizes that, since public choice theory is "far from mature, ' ' 89 it is too early to assess its full implications for public law. In his
view, however, "it is not too early.., to reject the profoundly pessimistic
implications of the early public choice theories." 90
One connection between self-interest and ideology is that because
legislators have an interest in being re-elected, it matters to them why
voters vote the way they do. Therefore, the failure of public choice theory to explain voting behavior is significant. As Farber explains:
If the policy espoused by one of the candidates would be in . . .[a

voter's] self-interest, she might vote for that person, but she would
have little reason to do so, since for all practical purposes there is no
causal link between her individual vote and that candidate's election.
On the other hand, since something other than self-interest evidently
motivated her to drive to the polls, that same motivation might quite
plausibly continue to influence her in her choice of candidates. 9
However, if voters vote for ideological reasons, then the self-interest of
legislators would make ideology relevant to the legislative decision-making process. For this reason, Professor Farber discusses recent studies
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id. at 160.
88. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Refiections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.-KI'NT L. Rirv. 161
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examining the role of ideology in explaining voter behavior. 92 In addition, he considers some evidence that the personal ideology of legislators
influences their roll call votes, and some studies of particular statutes
suggesting that their passage cannot be explained solely on grounds of
93
interest group influence.
Thus, we have three bodies of evidence that seem to point to the same
conclusion: the most careful econometric work, the findings of traditional social scientists, and historical investigations of the public choice
accounts of particular legislation. . . . Only a fool would deny the
can also be
importance of self-interest in the political process, but we
94
reasonably sure that self-interest is not the whole story.
Professor Farber then turns his attention to "social choice" or decision theory, the "branch of public choice theory suggests the... unpleasant possibility that legislation is random and arbitrary." 95 Farber
concedes that, "[m]ajoritarianism rests on the assumption that legislation
is linked to majority views, but public choice theory seems to deny any
such causal connection: outcomes are either random or driven by legislative features such as agenda rules, but in any event majority preferences
96
do not translate into a meaningful collective choice."
Along with Professor Mashaw, Professor Farber rejects as "unrealistic if not unpalatable ' 97 the answer suggested by the more utopian
strands of neo-republican thought, 98 which is to avoid the problem of
deciding among conflicting policies by using the political process to
render individual preferences substantially uniform and harmonious. Instead, Professor Farber identifies certain institutional features of legislatures that promote coherence and stability. 99 He explains how
behavioral norms such as fairness may stabilize voting outcomes even
when voter preferences contain massive cycles. 1°°
Assuming that legislatures are not wildly unstable or unpredictable,
Professor Farber then considers the possibility that using institutional
constraints to achieve this stability may result in a moral arbitrariness of
legislative results. He considers the normative appeal of some of these
constraints, such as majority rule, single-subject votes, and gatekeeper
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committees, the norm of fair division.10 1 Moreover, although individual
preferences may vary widely, people may still "share a common cultural
perspective which makes their disagreements coherent and understandable to each other ... [enabling them] to identify the source of disputes,
and to reach coherent and consistent decisions."' 0 2 He concludes that
"despite the possibilities of abuse, these stability-enhancing devices have
0 3
important normative virtues."
Professor Farber notes that, ironically, the decision theory dimension of public choice theory supports the neo-republican instinct that
"arbitrary preferences in themselves are likely to be insufficient to generate coherent social choices. Rather, preferences have to be processed
through the legislative machinery, applying norms such as fairness and
using committees and other stability-enhancing devices."',0 4 He is careful to add that good process does not guarantee good substance in either
legislation or adjudication. Still, although the responsibility for making
good choices rests with participants, a good decision-making process
makes good substantive decisions possible. 10 5 He concludes that "while
public choice methodology requires careful handling, it is potentially
06
very useful."
III.

BEYOND COLLECTIVE WELFARE: RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

It is a very short step from the institutional constraints supported by
a careful treatment of interest and decision theory to the rules that are
recommended by a rational choice approach. Rational choice theory,
moreover, opens up significant new territory to economic analysis. As
Jules Coleman notes in his Afterword:
Within the rational choice framework, legal rules are elements in a
scheme of rational cooperation. The traditional economic analysis,
which focuses entirely on the efficiency of perfect competition and the
inefficiency of market failure, blinds us to the ways in which the distributive and productive dimensions of legal and political constraints
are united in rational cooperation.' 07
Rational choice views legal rules as a way of closing the gap between
the results of private maximizing behavior and the gains that can accrue
101. Id. at 171-72.
102. Id. at 171.
103. Id. at 172.
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from cooperative behavior. Professor Coleman offers the following distinction between rational choice and traditional economic analyses.:
In the traditional economic analysis, legal rules rectify market failures
by encouraging efficient or Pareto optimal allocations of resources.
This is another way of saying that legal rules have a productive dimension. The one difference is that within the rational choice perspective,
legal rules must be both collectively and individually rational .... The

individual rationality condition imposes the constraint that legal rules
be mutually advantageous in a way in which
10 8 the collective rationality
or Pareto optimality condition does not.
For this reason, unlike traditional law and economics, a rational
choice framework views distributional concerns as an aspect of the problem of productivity.' 0 9 The movement toward the Pareto frontier (collective rationality) is only possible with cooperation, and cooperation
requires a distribution that is in the interest of those from whom cooperative behavior is desired (individual rationality). For Professor Coleman,
achieving individual rationality is as much a part of economic analysis as
achieving collective rationality. This leads him to incorporate into the
economic analysis of law a normative component that has traditionally
been associated with social contract theory and which is championed today by philosophers such as David Gauthier. 10 "Once we embed the
claim that the law ought to promote efficiency or rectify market failure in
a political or moral theory which makes that claim plausible or defensible, that is, the rational choice framework, the normative significance of
the analytic distinction between efficiency and distribution evaporates."" ' 1 Rational choice theory, unlike classical law and economics,
views the problem of distributing the surplus created by cooperation as
stemming from the need to motivate persons to act in the ways that make
such cooperative gains possible.
Professor Coleman then explains the tripartite rationality that rational choice requires. The first or search phase requires the identification of a possible cooperative gain-what he calls collective rationality;
the second or division phase requires a way to divide the gain-what he
calls concession or bargaining rationality; the third or monitoring phase
requires the investment of resources to secure compliance with the bargain-what he calls individual rationality.' 12 Each phase of rational
choice corresponds to a different kind of transaction cost: search costs,
108. Id. at 181.
109. Id. at 181-82.
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division costs, and monitoring costs. The ability to achieve choice that is
rational in all three ways depends upon the transaction resources that are
available to manage the three kinds of transaction costs. These transaction resources include social institutions-such as closely knit groupsthat reduce these costs, and Professor Coleman discusses the ways that
such resources can be provided by parties to agreements. When these
resources are provided by legal rules rather than the parties themselves,
what in the absence of the "state" is a two party contracting problem,
becomes, in its presence, a three party problem. That fact alone increases search, division and defection problems ....

Thus legal rules

are never taken as given. Their explanation depends upon their relative
transaccosts and benefits especially in comparison with 1endogenous
3
tion resources upon which the parties can draw.'
In Professor Coleman's opinion, "Chicago-style law and economics"
is mistaken in a way that Ronald Coase was not. Instead of doing an
analytic end-run around them, "[t]ransaction costs are a black box that
needs to be filled in. It is distinctly unhelpful always to reconstruct a
legal rule as a solution to a market failure caused by transaction
costs.

11

4

The way to fill in the "transaction cost box" is (a) to identify

the context or environment of the problem being addressed, (b) to identify both the factors in this environment that, by increasing uncertainty,
create each of the three kinds of transaction costs (search, division, and
monitoring) and the resources that may be available to the persons involved to reduce these costs, and finally, (c) to determine whether the
problem that a legal rule allegedly is needed to address concerns a shortfall of resources to reduce coordination, division, or defection uncertainty." 5 "Only in this way is the view of law as a response to transaction costs meaningful and informative, for only then can we understand
which sort of transaction cost is involved and which sort of endogenous
transaction resource is in inadequate supply." 1 6 Professor Coleman
concludes his Afterword by suggesting how the analytic framework of
rational choice is useful in understanding the law of contract.,
'7

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The rational choice perspective described by Jules Coleman suggests
that Post-Chicago law and economics may be seen as a limited partnership between economic and philosophical methods. A few years ago I
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described the reemergence of legal philosophy as a rival to (and also a
reaction against) the prevailing mode of law and economics.'1 8 Rather
than one movement vanquishing the other, what seems to have occurred
is that each has learned from the other so that the gap between them is
rapidly narrowing. 19 I also observed that the philosophical criticisms of
law and economics may make "possible a challenge to the orthodoxy of
Posnerian efficiency ....,,120 Post-Chicago law and economics appears to
represent this challenge. However, by now it should be evident that
Post-Chicago law and economics is neither a wholesale rejection of the
older law and economics nor a single school of thought, but instead consists of a variety of fresh approaches to both old and new questions. This
symposium does not include every dimension of Post-Chicago law and
economics, but I hope that it conveys enough of its promise to intrigue
readers to cast aside their stereotypes of economic analysis and to learn
more.
I am deeply grateful to my co-editor, Jules Coleman, whose tremendous efforts on behalf of this symposium issue entitle him to a lion's share
of the credit for its success. Jules and I both thank the symposium contributors for their excellent papers and the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law for graciously providing us with a
forum for what we hope is an important and provocative discussion. Finally, we are most appreciative to the student members of the ChicagoKent Law Review for doing the "real" editing of this issue. In particular,
we thank Editor-in-Chief Steve Wood for his unstinting enthusiasm and
cooperation. Let those who doubt that students and faculty can amicably collaborate in an important scholarly endeavor come to ChicagoKent.
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